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Bankruptcy-Right to Priority Denied Federal Housing Ad-
ministrator-Federal Housing Administrator insured bank against
losses on home modernization loans.' Debtor filled out form in applying
for a loan wherein the Administrator was named as insurer. Debtor was
adjudicated bankrupt and subsequent thereto the Administrator paid the
bank which assigned the note to the Administrator. Administrator bases
his claim for priority on the implied contract of indemnity between debtor
and self. Held, priority denied, Administrator must base the claim on
bank's rights under the principle of subrogation.2 In re Miller, 105 F.
(2d) 926 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
To have priority attach, the government business must be carried on
through an administrative agency and not by a government-formed cor-
poration.2 That the Administrator is such an agent is well settled.4 Also,
for the purposes of allowing claims in bankruptcy, the word debt has been
endowed with a liberal, flexible definition both by statute 5 and the courts.,
Therefore, where the creditor assigns his claim to the Administrator before
bankruptcy proceedings, the government has been considered to have a
debt owing to it based on the policy that, fundamentally, government funds
are involved.7 However, if bankruptcy preceded the assignment, then the
government has only the rights the assignor enjoyed by operation of the
principle of subrogation; and, in the absence of a priority in the assignor 8
it may enter proceedings only as a general creditor." This latter rule was
i. 48 STAT. 1246, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1703 (1934), as amended by 52 STAT. 9, 12 U. S.
C. A. § 1703 (a) (Supp. 1938).
2. BANxKL Acr § 57 (i), 30 STAT. 56o (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (i) (927), as
amended by 52 STAT. 866, 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (i) (Supp. 1938).
3. United States Ship. B. E. Fleet Corp. v. Wood, 258 U. S. 549 (1922); see
United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 280 U. S. 478, 483 (1930), (93) 5
TULANE L. REv. 311; cf. United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. io6 (1923);
Cohn v. United States Ship. Bd., 20 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Whan v. Green
Star Steamship Corp., 22 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), cert. denied, Adams v.
United States, 276 U. S. 629 (2928).
4. Wagner v. McDonald, 96 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), 52 HARv. L. RV.
320; In re T. N. Wilson, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 65I (E. D. N. Y. 1938), (1939) 12 So.
CALIF. L. Rav. 307, 25 VA. L. REv. 369; in re Wilson, 23 F. Supp. 236 (N. D. Tex.
1938) ; In re Dickson's Estate, 197 Wash. 145, 84 P. (2d) 661 (1938).
No weight has been given to the fact that the National Housing Act provides
that part of the funds at the disposal of F. H. A. may be allocated to it by the R. F. C.,
a government-formed corporation. 48 STAT. 1247, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1705 (1934).
5. "Debt shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy." 30
STAT. 544 (2898), 11 U. S. C. A. J i (1I) (927). A liberal classification of provable
debts may be found in the CHAANDLER Acr § 63 (a), 52 STAT. 873, 11 U. S. C. A.
§103 (a) (Supp. 1938).
6. See Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 249 (1924) ; Price v. United States, 269
U. S. 492, 500 (1926) ; it re Wilson, 23 F. Supp. 236, 239 (N. D. Tex. 1938).
7. Wagner v. McDonald, 96 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 2938), 52 HARV. L. REV.
320; In re T. N. Wilson, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 65, (E. D. N. Y. 1938), (1939) 12 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 307, 25 VA. L. REV. 369 (time of assignment uncertain) ; In re Wilson,
23 F. Supp. 236 (N. D. Tex. 1938) (time of assignment uncertain) ; In re Dickson's
Estate, 197 Wash. 145, 84 P. (2d) 661 (1938).
8. Shropshire Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204 U. S. 186 (1907).
9. United States v. Marxen, 307 U. S. 200 (1939); Federal Housing Adminis-
trator v. Moore, 9o F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; In re Hansen Bakeries, Inc., 103
F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; In re Wissmeier. 26 F. Supp. 8o6 (E. D. N. Y.
1939) ; In re Stamford Auto Supply Co., 25 F. Supp. 530 (N. D. Tex. 1938).
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definitely established in United States v. Marxen,10 the effect of which the
Administrator attempted to circumvent by bringing this suit. But the
instant decision strengthens the rule as laid down by that case and is
indicative of the trend to limit granting of priorities to the government.'1
In addition, in these situations the Administrator assumes the role of
surety and, prior to the principal creditor's assignment, that of a con-
tingent creditor. Such a contingent creditor cannot petition for the
debtor's bankruptcy on the basis of his contingent claim.' Nor may he
use this contingent claim for the purpose of setting off a personal debt due
the bankrupt principal;'3 nor for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction for
his loss under the principle of reimbursement 14 as was tried here. Of
course, to compensate the surety for his loss of the right of reimbursement,
the surety is given the privilege of becoming subrogated into the position of
the creditor. 5 The instant case, therefore, is consistent with the principles
10. 307 U. S. 200 (939).
ii. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 33 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 8th,
1929), 43 HARV. L. REV. 146; City of Chelsea v. Dolan, 24 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. Ist,
1928), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 6o6 (1928) ; accord, In the Matter of Stewart, 6 Am. B.
R. (x. s.) (N. D., Referee, 1925), (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 767; see Mellon v. Mich-
igan Trust Co., 271 U. S. 236, 239 (1926) ; cf. (927) 4o HARv. L. REv. 322. "There
appears to us no paramount public interest in the priority of the United States among
those who have taken the same risks and engaged in the -same ventures as itself." In re
Gesteiger & Co., Inc., 25 F. (2d) 642, 643 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). Contra: Davis v.
Pullen, 277 Fed. 65o (C. C. A. ISt, 1922).
Indicative of this trend in statutes is the National Bnakruptcy Act itself. This
provided that all provable claims had to be filled within six months after bankruptcy;
no mention was made of the United States, a State or any subdivision thereof. 30
STAT. 561 (I898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (n) (1927). But the Chandler Act expressly
included the United States, any State or subdivision thereof. 52 STAT. 867, II U. S.
C. A. § 93 (n) (Supp. 1938).
12. Phillips v. Dreher Shoe Co., 112 Fed. 404 (M. D. Pa. 19o2); Holbrook, A
Surety's Claim Against His Bankrupt Principal (1912) 6o U. OF PA. L. REV. 482, 489,
where the logical reasoning is advanced that if there were a number of indorsers, any
one of them might be liable and all would, therefore, have a provable claim under a con-
trary view which could be the foundation of a petition against the debtor. But cf.
Wright v. Rumph, 238 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916) ; In re Thompson, 3oo Fed. 215
(W. D. Pa. 1924).
The statute provides that creditors who have provable claims fixed as to liability
and liquidated as to amount may file a petition to force bankruptcy. 52 STAT. 868, 11
U. S. C. A. § 95 (b) (Supp. 1938). Supporting this provision, WEINSTEIN, THE BANK-
Rurcy LAW OF 1938 (1938) IIO-III; criticizing it, MOORE, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL
(1939) 159.
13. In re Bingham, 94 Fed. 796 (D. Vt. 1899).
14. Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U. S. 549 (1915) ; Insley v.
Garside, 121 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o3), rehearing denied, order modified, 123 Fed.
78 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o3); In re Dr. Voorhees Awning Hood Co., 187 Fed. 611 (M. D.
Pa. 1911); Holbrook, supra note 12, at 49o; Keefe, Provability of Contingent Claims
in Bankruptcy (938) 12 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 59, 64. Even where the surety has
paid the debt, proof must be in the creditor's name. In re Dillon, 1oo Fed. 627 (D.
Mass. 19oo); It re Heymann, 95 Fed. 8oo (S. D. N. Y. 1899). Contra: McLaughlin,
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 583, 586, where it is ad-
vocated that the surety be allowed to prove in his own name. However, the argument
advanced seemed to be under a misapprehension as to the effect of the Bankrupcty At
provisions.
But where there are fraudulent conveyances by the debtor, the holder of a con-
tingent claim is given the status of a creditor to enable him to become a petitioner for
bankruptcy. American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Marotta, 287 U. S. 513 (C. C. A. Ist,
1933), 31 MICH. L. Rrv. 1151; ef. Thomson v. Crance, 73 Fed. 327 (D. Neb. 1896);
Yardley v. Torr, 67 Fed. 857 (E. D. Pa. 1895).
I5. See Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U. S. 549, 556 (1915).
This privilege is specifically given by the Bankruptcy Act, 3o STAT. 560 018g8), II U.
S. C. A. § 93 i) (1927), and is retained by the Chandler Act, 52 STAT. 866, I1 U. S.
C. A. § 93 (i) (Supp. 1938).
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of suretyship, and gives effect to the equitable principle that there should be
equality among creditors in bankruptcy by its refusal to extend the law
governing priorities of government claims, a problem of growing importance
in view of the steady increase of these administrative agencies.
Conflict of Laws-Power of Federal Courts Under Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins to Disregard State Decisions Based on Inferences From
Facts-Plaintiff proved he entered railroad intersection relying on the
fact that the warning bell was not ringing, and collided with defendant's
parked freight cars which plaintiff claims he could not previously see because
of the dark color of the cars, fog and darkness. Contending that Erie R. R.
v. Tompkins I did not bind a federal court to follow a state court ruling
based on inferences from the facts, 2 the court refused to apply a prior Mis-
souri decision 3 which, in a similar case, held plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law on the ground that his claimed inability to see
was physically impossible, and held, that this plaintiff was not guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law because his professed inability
to see was not a physical impossibility. Moore v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.,
28 F. Supp. 8o4 (W. D. Mo. 1939).
With this case the revolutionary 4 doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins
receives a further limitation of practical importance. While that decision
served broadly to eradicate the earlier concept of a "federal common law",5
it remained for subsequent rulings to define the ramifications of that sweep-
ing decision 6 which has wrought its effect in one way or another upon
many points of law." The rules of evidence, including presumptions and
inferences from facts, have come generally to be regarded as outside the
i. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state . . . whether
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision ... "
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938).
2. In State ex rel. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 1195, I05 S. W. (2d)
915 (937), cited infra note 3, the court contended, at 22o4, that the plaintiff's testimony
that he could not see was "contrary to physical laws and facts of universal knowledge",
and the federal district court in the instant case, at 8o6, maintains that while it is
"bound to agree that testimony as to facts which is contrary to 'physical laws and facts
of universal knowledge' should be disregarded . . . the Erie Railroad decision (does
not declare or intimate) that the judicial voice of a state is controlling authority as to
physical laws . . . or as to what are facts of universal knowledge".
3. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 195, 105 S. W. (2d) 915 (1937), cited
supra note 2, where plaintiff, who was injured when he collided with defendant's freight
car standing across the highway, claimed he could not see the car until within several
feet of the crossing, because it was "kind of a dark night" and the whirling snow and
dust made visibility poor, and the court held as a matter of law that he was contribu-
torily negligent.
4. It overthrew the aged and well-established concept of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1
(U. S. 2842), that the federal courts should exercise their independent judgment in
diversity of citizenship cases involving general law, and need not apply the unwritten
law of a state as declared by its highest court.
5. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842), cited supra note 4.
6. The state law regarding the applicability of res ipsa loquitur [Coca-Cola v.
Munn, 99 F. (2d) 19o (C. C. A. 4th, 1938)], the state law governing auto collision
cases [Zentz v. Buchman, lO3 F. (2d) 85o (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) ], "actionable negligence"
[Kansas Gas & Electric v. Evans, IOO F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A. Ioth, 2938)], the con-
struction of a life insurance policy [North Am. Accident Ins. v. Anderson, ioo F. (2d)
452 (C. C. A. Ioth, 1938)1, substantive property rights, commercial law and the meas-
ure of damages [Bailey v. Porter-Wadley Lumber, 28 F. Supp. 25, 28 (W. D. La.
1939) ; also in Pruit v. Porter-Wadley Lumber, 28 F. Supp. 31, 32 (W. D. La. 1939)]
were all held binding on the federal courts.
7. See note 6 supra.
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scope of the Erie doctrine as a result of their classification as a procedural
rather than a substantive matter." Factual determination and appraisal
have also repeatedly been held to constitute a field in which the independent
judgment of the federal judiciary reigns unimpaired.9 Thus the instant
court's refutation of the earlier state court decision on point "I does not
come as a flagrant repudiation of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. However, state
decisions on many phases of negligence and contributory negligence have
frequently been considered binding upon federal courts." And thus it might
seem more consistent with the spirit 12 of the Erie doctrine, to follow state
rulings where the facts before a federal court are identical 13 with those
which the state court had previously decided. Yet, to extend the Erie con-
cept so as to subjugate the discretion of federal judges to the factual infer-
ences and presumptions of individual state courts, would be to accentuate
infinitely one of the more poignant objections to that doctrine-its tendency
to reduce uniformity in the law. 4 Furthermore, though the basis for the
instant decision-the factual distinction between this case and the Missouri
precedent based solely on diverse inference from the facts "--may con-
ceivably be considered questionable, nevertheless, the result obtained,
namely, leaving to the jury the evaluation of the natural and physical facts,
can be deemed to justify the means.'
8. Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, 1477; 1 MOORE, FEzAaL PRAcTIcE (1938)
42, that evidence and the rules of evidence are a matter generally included in the term
"procedure", although there was once a difference of opinion on this matter among
members of the Supreme Court; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1351, ". . . federal
power over procedure in the federal courts is left undisturbed by the Tompkins case."
Contra: Boal v. Electric Storage Battery, 98 F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), where
federal court accepted standard of "competent evidence" as decreed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Vorbnoff v. Mesta Mach., 286 Pa. 199, 133 Atl. 256 (1926) ; Note
(1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1475; ibid. n. I8.
9. Note (1939) 18 Nm. L. BuLL. 67; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 2349. Contra:
Boal v. Electric, 98 F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), cited supra note 8; Mangol v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 2O3 F. (2d) 14 CC. C. A. 7th, 1939), where state
court's factual definition accepted.
10. See note 3 supra.
ii. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 85: "Unquestionably the issue of negli-
gence and contributory negligence . . . are questions of general law . . ."; id. at
68 (and the case in fact decided that federal courts were to be bound by state decisions
in matters of "general" or "common" law); Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Washington
Water Power Co., 99 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) ; Schopp v. Muller Dairies, 25
F. Supp. 5o (E. D. N. Y. 1938); Note (938) 37 MicH. L. REV. 1249, 1252.
12. The feeling of the Supreme Court is best expressed by the words of justice
Field (B. & 0. Ry. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 402 (1893)), included in the opinion of
Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (2938).
13. The court in the instant case, at 8o6, contends it would have reached the same
result even if the facts of this case were "in all respects identical" to those in State ex
rel. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Shamn, cited note 2 supra.
14. See I MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 98, 99; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1336, 1348 (although it is further stated in the same article, that the benefits antici-
pated under Swift v. Tyson, namely uniform and better law, did not actually materialize
to any great extent).
15. Whereas the Missouri Supreme Court in the Shai case, cited note 2 suzpra,inferred visibility from the attendant natural facts, and thus held the plaintiff contrib-
utorily negligent as a matter of law, the court in the instant case at 8o5, conversely,
took judicial notice of almost identical natural facts and deduced possible nonvisibility
to hold plaintiff not contributorily negligent.
16. Compare Rape v. Tenn. A. & Q. R. R., 47 Ga. App. 96, 169 S. E. 764 (1933),
with Mabray v. Union Pac. R. R., 5 F. Supp. 397 (1933) ; compare Travelers' Indem-
nity v. Parkersburg, 70 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), with Mannen v. Norris, 338
Ill. 322, 17o N. E. 273 (1930). IO R. C. L. 2OO9 § 298, and cases annotated n. 13; I
MooRE, A TREATIsE ON FACTS (1908) 330-31 (illustrating the desirability of jury con-
sideration upon factual circumstances, since the deductions to be made from such cir-
cumstances vary with each situation).
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Constitutional Law-Prohibition of Sales Below Cost in Viola-
tion of Due Process Clause-A "fair sales act" 1 prohibited the "adver-
tisement, offer for sale or sale of merchandise at less than cost" by re-
tailers. In a prosecution thereunder, it was held, that the act was unconsti-
tutional, depriving defendant of his property without due process of law.
Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 8 A. (2d) 291 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1939).
The state's prerogative to fix prices on proper occasion is now generally
accepted as another phase of the police power. The noted Nebbia case 2
formulated this concept from the vagaries theretofore existing,3 holding
that, where the public good is involved, due process is satisfied if the laws
passed are not arbitrary but have a reasonable reldtion to the furtherance
of the legislative purpose. Therein lies the inefficacy of the instant statute;
it is unique in unqualifiedly prohibiting sales below cost regardless of
intent, purpose, or effect upon fair trade. Obviously aimed at unfair com-
petition, it is not limited to those transactions alone which are designed to
injure competitors or destroy competition. Its arbitrary effect is patent.4
A retailer must meet the prices of competitors to survive, which may neces-
sitate selling an article below cost.5 He thereby preserves rather than
destroys competition, for he prevents monopoly. But the large scale re-
tailer, e. g., the chain store, having greater resources, may substantially
injure him by sustained below cost selling. The inevitable result under the
act would be prosecution in both instances, whereas only the latter involves
a real fair trade offense. By thus applying irrespective of motive or intent,
it has no reasonable relation to the anticipated evil., The legislative attempt
I. N. J. LAWS 1938, c. 394- For brief discussions of the history and theory of fair
sales acts, see Oler, Statutory Inhibition Against Sales Below Cost (939) 43 DICK.
L. REv. 112; Legis. (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1142; Note (1938) 32 ILL. L. REV. 816.
2. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L' REV.
619.3. It is interesting to follow the history of governmental regulation of prices. The
dogma has long been that those industries "affected with a public interest" are subject
to regulation. The problem arises in the interpretation of that phrase. In Chas. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 535 (1923), the court
divided businesses affected with a public interest into three classes: "(I) Those which
are carried on under authority of a public grant of privileges which either expressly or
impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded by any
member of the public . . . (2) Certain occupations regarded as exceptional, the pub-
lic interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has survived the period
of arbitrary laws by Parliament or Colonial legislatures for regulating all trades and
callings . . . (3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be fairly
said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to some govern-
ment regulation. . . ." The vigorous dissents in all the cases are illustrative of the
obscurity enshrouding the meaning of the term. Much to the point is the language of
Justice Stone dissenting in Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 359 (1928), to the effect
that "affected with a public interest" means whatever the court chooses to say it means.
The Nebbia case has now apparently removed the need for the term in judicial opinion.
On this subject in general, see Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some
Reflections on Nebbia v. New York (934) 34 COL. L. 'REV. 401; Hamilton, Affectation
With Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. io8g.
4. In addition to the argument presented, other examples of how freedom of con-
tract is impaired are found in Commonwealth v. Hodin, 34 Pa. D. & C. 270, 275 (1938),
where Pennsylvania's practically identical fair sales act was declared unconstitutional.
For example: "A dealer in livestock could not dispose of any of his herd at less than
cost although he might deem it advisable to do so rather than expend the amount neces-
sary for their care and maintenance during the winter months."
5. Price cutting, by itself, has never been deemed unfair competition. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919); see
Wilentz v. Crown Laundry Service, Inc., 116 N. J. Eq. 40, 44, 172 Atl. 331, 333 (1934).
6. This reasoning finds strong support in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,
274 U. S. I (1927). There, defendant was prosecuted for violating a statute punishing
milk dealers who discriminate between different localities by buying milk at one place
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to circumvent this argument proves ineffective. Prices cut "to meet the
legal price of a competitor for merchandise of the same grade, quality and
quantity" are exempted 7 but no determinant of "legal price" appears.
Being thus unable to ascertain the "legality" of his competitor's price, the
vendor meets that price at his risk, which is constitutionally repugnant.
One cannot be required at his peril to speculate as to the meaning of penal
acts ; 8 vagueness to the point of guessing at statutory meanings is fatal, for
certainty is the first essential of due process.9 Further, the effect of the
exemption defeats its very purpose. Because of the uncertainty of his
position, the vendor would either not sell at all, resulting in monopoly, or,
if he did cut to his competitor's price and the latter proved "illegal", he
would be convicted for pursuing perfectly valid trade tactics.10  Of twenty-
six other states having fair sales acts,"' the majority require an intent to
injure competition,' 2 and they have withstood attacks of unconstitution-
ality.' 3  It is interesting to compare the fate of the Pennsylvania act '4
at a higher price than they pay at another. The act was designed to prevent powerful
buyers from paying excessive prices for the purpose of destroying competition. It was
declared unconstitutional because it too applied irrespective of motive or intent, thereby
having no reasonable relation to the anticipated evil.
7. N. J. LAws 1938, c. 394, § 8 (e). Other exemptions are: "(a) where merchan-
dise is sold in bona fide clearance sales and is advertised, marked and sold as such, (b)
where merchandise is imperfect or damaged or is being discontinued and is advertised,
marked and sold as such, (c) where merchandise is sold upon the final liquidation of
any business, (d) where merchandise is sold for charitable purposes, . . . and (f)
where merchandise is sold by any officer acting under the direction of any court."
8. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 3o6 U. S. 451 (0939).
9. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926).
zo. See note 5 supra.
ii. Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Idaho, Ky., La. (drugs), Me., Md., Mass.,
Mich. (bakery and petroleum products), Minn., Mont., Neb., Ore., Pa., R. I., S. C.,
Tenn., Utah, Va., Wash., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo. All of these statutes are collected in
io6 C. C. H. 1938 Trade Reg. Serv., indexed at p. goo2, with the exception of the Ne-
braska act which is found in Neb. Sess. Laws, 1937, c. 137.
12. Besides Pennsylvania, the minority includes Idaho, Lousiana and Nebraska.
The Idaho statute states (§ 2) that selling below cost "in order to attract patronage" is
unfair competition. It then flatly declares ( 4) "that any advertising, offer to sell or
sale of merchandise by a retailer at less than cost to the retailer . . . is unfair com-
petition and contrary to public policy and to the policy of this Act, and tends to deceive
the purchasers, or prospective purchasers, and tends to create a monopoly in commerce."
One selling below cost "in contravention of the policy of this Act" is guilty of a mis-
demeanor (3 5). The Lousiana statute, after prohibiting sales of drugs below cost
(§ 2b), declares that "willful violation of this Act shall be a misdemeanor" (Q 4). So
far as is known, these acts have not been tested. In the Nebraska "Unfair Practices
Act", § i prohibited price discrimination with intent to injure competition, and § 3 pro-
hibited sales below cost where its effect would be to injure competition. This act was
before the court in State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607
(0938), much relied upon by the instant court, where it was held that § 3, because it
lacked the intent clause, was indefinite, uncertain and void, and insufficient to sustain
a prosecution thereunder, the court expressly stating that it was not considering con-
stitutional questions. It would seem, however, that §§ i and 3 might have been con-
strued together, thereby upholding the statute, if such had been desired.
13. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. National
Candy and Tobacco Co., ii Cal. (2d) 634, 82 P. (2d) 3 (1938) ; Jonke Grocery v.
Save-A-Nickel Stores, Inc., 107 C. C. H. 1938 Trade Reg. Serv. 1125230 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. 1937) ; Associated Merchants of Montana v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P. (2d)
1031 (I939) ; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S. W. (2d) 733 (938), 86 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 78o; State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P. (2d) 767 (1938) ; cf. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. z938), where the section of the
Minnesota act prohibiting sales below cost with intent to injure competition was
declared valid, but, since other necessary sections were unconstitutional, the entirety
failed because of lack of support for the prohibitory section. Especially pertinent to
the instant decision is the dictum of the Wholesale Tobacco Dealers case, supra at 658,
82 P. (2d) at i7: "It would certainly add to the weight of appellant's argument on the
224 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
which, being practically identical with the instant one, was declared uncon-
stitutional because of the lack of an intent clause.15 The collapse of these
acts exemplifies the strictness with which statutes in derogation of common
law rights 16 are construed,' and, consequently, the care with which they
must be drafted.
Damages-Telegraph Companies-Limitation of Liability Clause
on Telegram Construed as Liquidated Damages-Plaintiff contracted
to send money order for one hundred and fifty dollars from California to
business partner in Republic of Honduras. The money order was ac-
cepted as an unrepeated message under a condition printed on the back of
the blank and filed with defendant's schedule of rates with the Federal
Communications Commission: ". . . the company shall not be liable for
damages for . . . non-payment . . . whether by reason of negligence
. . . or otherwise, beyond the sum of $5o0, at which amount the right to
have this money order promptly and correctly transmitted and promptly
and fully paid is hereby valued . . .. " For the defendant's failure to
transmit the money to the sendee, plaintiff sought $76o0 damages, but
failed to prove any damage.1 Held, that the parties agreed, for the pur-
poses of a contract, upon a definite evaluation for the breach of the con-
tract, and that evaluation is a stipulation for liquidated damages.2 Nester
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 30, 1939,
p. i, col. 2 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
Telegraph companies are allowed to limit their liability to sender for
negligence in the transmission of unrepeated messages; 3 and the printed
main issue if the statute omitted intent as an integral part of the act prohibited. It is
one thing, from a legal standpoint, to prohibit sales below cost engaged in for the pur-
pose of injuring competitors and destroying competition, and quite another to merely
prohibit all such sales regardless of intent. It may well be that an absolute prohibition
regardless of intent would be unreasonable. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minne-
sota."
14. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 73, §§ 201-207.
15. Commonwealth v. Hodin, 34 Pa. D. & C. 27o (938) ; Commonwealth v. Zas-
loff, 86 Pitt. Leg. J. 597 (I938).
I6. The right of the owner to fix the price at which his property shall sell is an
inherent attribute of the property itself. See Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall.
232, 278 (U. S. 1872) ; Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Ban-
ton, 273 U. S. 418, 429 (I927), Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 778.
17. See Tinsman v. Belvidere Delaware R. R., 26 N. J. L. 148, 167 (1857);
Wilentz v. Crown Laundry Service, Inc., 116 N. J. Eq. 40, 42, 172 Atl. 331, 332 (I934).
i. The District Court, which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, found
that plaintiff's contention that his partnership goods were confiscated by the Honduran
government as a consequence of non-delivery of the telegram was unjustified and that
the failure to send the telegram was not the proximate cause of the loss. 25 F. Supp.
478 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
2. Under the new federal rules of Civil Procedure, the court allowed the plaintiff
to recover under the limitation of liability clause which was brought into issue by the
defendant, even though the plaintiff utterly failed in proving any of the damages which
he alleged, stating that the plaintiff should recover not on the basis of his allegations
but on the facts proved. FED. RULES CIV. PROC. (1938), Rules 2, 15 (b), 28 U. S. C.
A. (Supp. 1938) following § 723c.
3. Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., I54 U. S. I (894) (mistake in
transmission) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Czizek, 264 U. S. 281 (924) (failure
to transmit); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S. 252 (1928) (gross
negligence); United States Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232 (1868) (mis-
take) Wann v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. 472 (1866) (same). Also the
English and Canadian rule. MacAndrew v. The Electric Telegraph Co., I7 C. B. 3
(1855) ; Baxter v. Dominion Telegraph Co., 37 U. C. Q. B. 47o (1875).
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condition on the money order in the present case is similar to that on the
ordinary telegraph message blank, being placed there in compliance with
an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which was concerned
with the raising of the pre-existing limitations of liability for the com-
pany's negligence, 4 and not concerned with a stipulation for liquidated
damages. Although the general rule of construction in case of doubt is to
construe a writing most strongly against the party by whom it was
drafted,' in cases where the liquidated damage argument was raised, the
courts have specifically rejected it as contrary to the intention of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission,6 while various other cases interpreted similar
clauses as limitations of liability without raising or referring to the argu-
ment for liquidated damages.7 By analogy to other contract cases in which
similar stipulations had been held to be liquidated damages," the court
awarded plaintiff the sum stipulated in the blank as liquidated damages in
contract, reasoning that since the company fixed the value of the right to
have the telegram delivered, when suit is brought for violation of that
right, it cannot say that it did not intend to fix the value at the sum named
but at a sum up to the sum named. But the essence of liquidated damages
"is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damages",' and since this clause
will have general application to every money order, it cannot be said to
contain the parties' pre-estimate of the damages which might result from
breach of this particular contract.10 Neither can the decision rest on the
ground that the damages were uncertain or difficult of computation," in
as much as plaintiff totally failed to prove any damage as a result of de-
fendant's act.' Since the plaintiff in reality suffered no damage other than
the price of the money order and the cost of the telegram, both of which
he can readily recover,18 the stipulation in the contract should have been
regarded merely as a limitation of liability or as a penalty.
Insurance-Part Payment "In Full Satisfaction" Under Facility
of Payment Clause-Administratrix of the insured brought suit upon
two industrial insurance policies of $20o each, payable to the executor or
administrator, unless payment be made under provisions of the "Facility
4. Unrepeated Message Case, 61 I. C. C. 541 (1921).
5. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 236d.
6. Wernick v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 29o Ill. App. 569, 9 N. E. (2d) 72
(937) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Anderson, 245 S. W. 73, (Tex. Civ. App.
1922) ; but see Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283, 289 (1882) senible.
7. Postal Telegraph Co. v. Warren-Godwin, 251 U. S. 27 (919); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Brothers & Co., 256 U. S. 566 (1921); Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S. 252 (1928). See also Unrepeated Message Case, 44 I.
C. C. 67o, 675 (1917) ; Note (1923) I TEX. L. REV. 336.
8. Sun Printing and Publishing Association v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642 (19o2);
Ayres & Graves v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 502 (8938) ; Hanlon Drydock & Ship-
building Co. v. McNear, 70 Cal. App. 204, 232 Pac. oo2 (1924).
9. Shields v. Early, 132 Miss. 282, 95 So. 839 (1923); see 3 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (1936) § 783.
10. (1939) 52 HARV. L. REV. 839.
II. 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACs (936) § 783; RESTATEmENT, CoNTRACTS (1932)
§ 339.
82. For a good discussion on the necessity of proof of damages in suits on con-
tracts with stipulations for breach, see (1925) 34 A. L. R. 1336.
13. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Priester, 276 U. S. 252 (1928) ; (937) 37
COL. L. REv. 98o.
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of Payment" clause.- In defense the defendant produced a receipt for $21
(the amount of the paid-in premiums) 2 given by the widow "in full satis-
faction" after the insurer made a bona fide representation that the policy
was unenforceable.' Held, judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of
the policies, less the amount returned to the widow. McCaffry v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 192 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
It is generally held that Facility of Payment clauses are for the benefit
of the insurer, to be exercised at his option, and that they give a bene-
ficiary under the clause no right of action even if equitably entitled to pay-
ment.4 The claim belongs to the administrator but it is contingent on the
right of the insurer to pay any relative,5 and full payment in good faith to
a beneficiary under the clause operates as a complete discharge of the in-
surer's obligations.6 Where there is payment to a relative of less than the
face value, as in the instant case, the few authorities are divided. The
jurisdictions of Pennsylvania and Illinois hold it a complete defense saying
that when the insurer exercises his option to pay a particular person under
the clause, that person is vested with a claim which can then be validly
compromised, and it cannot matter to anyone else who is paid, nor how
much, 7 especially if the administrator is not yet appointed." On the other
hand New York has reached the opposite result, holding that since an
unnamed beneficiary can generally not bring suit on such a policy, he has
no enforceable claim to release.9 Inherent in the argument of the court in
the instant case, was the fear that if partial settlements are permitted to
discharge insurance companies from their obligation to pay out the face
value of small industrial policies, an opportunity is thereby provided for
securing releases from distant relatives for a mere pittance. It seems that
the interpretation in the instant case is the more desirable when one takes
into consideration the superior bargaining position of the insurer, and the
readiness with which it may be utilized as an instrument of fraud not easily
controllable by the courts. 10 Furthermore, to hold part payment a good
i. This provided--"It is understood and agreed that the said company may make
any payment . . . to the wife, or relative by blood or connection by marriage to the
insured, or to pay any person appearing to said company to be equitably entitled to the
same by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the insured . . . ".
2. The Facility of Payment clause further provided--"that the production of a re-
ceipt signed by any or either of said persons shall be conclusive evidence . . . that
all claims under this policy have been fully satisfied."
3. The insurer contended that a physician's proofs of the insured's illness prior to
the issuance of the policy was conclusive proof that the insured was not in sound health
at the issuance. The court held that this testimony of the physician did not establish
poor health or that the insured had a serious disease so as to preclude recovery.
4. Bishop v. Prudential Insurance Co., 217 Ill. App. 112 (1920) ; Prudential Insur-
ance Co. v. Ritchey, 188 Ind. 157, 119 N. E. 369 (1918) ; Pettit v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co., 231 Mass. 394, 121 N. E. 28 (ii) ; Manning v. Prudential Insurance Co.,
202 Mo. App. 124, 213 S. W. 897 (1919); Marzulli v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
79 N. J. L. 271, 75 Atl. 473 (Sup. Ct. i9io) ; Nolan v. Prudential Insurance Co., 139
App. Div. 166, 123 N. Y. Supp. 688 (2d Dep't igio) ; Williard v. Prudential Insurance
Co., 276 Pa. 427, 12o Atl. 461 (1923).
5. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 583.
6. Jones' Administrator v. Prudential Insurance Co., 225 Ky. 238, 8 S. W. (2d)
412 (1928) ; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bates, 33o Miss. 399, 94 So. 216 (1922).
7. Sheridan v. Prudential Insurance Co., 128 Ill. App. 519 (19o6); Brennan v.
Prudential Insurance Co., 17o Pa. 488, 32 Atl. lO42 (1895).
8. (1936) 24 CALIF. L. REV. 321 at 328.
q. Kane v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 143 Misc. 631, 256 N. Y. Supp. 917
(Ist Dep't 1930) ; McCarthy v. Prudential Insurance Co., 252 N. Y. 459, 16g N. E. 645
(930), 39 YALE L. J. io65. See also RicHARns, LAW OF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932)
553 et seq.
IO. Kane v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 143 Misc. 631, 256 N. Y. Supp. 917
(Ist Dep't 393o).
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defense is to overlook the ultimate rights of claimants among themselves,
for the exercise of the insurer's option does not constitute the final disposi-
tion of the fund."
Labor Law-Recognition of the Union as an Essential Factor in
Collective Bargaining Under the N. L. R. B.-Lodge 1197 of the Amal-
gamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of North America, a
union comprising a large majority of defendant company's employees,
selected and authorized a committee of its members to negotiate with com-
pany officials regarding certain labor disputes. Defendant refused to nego-
tiate with the committee as a representative of the Lodge but chose instead
to treat it as a committee of its employees. The National Labor Relations
Board found that this action constituted an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of § 158(5) and § 159(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act,' and issued an order to cease and desist. Held, recognition of the
union as such is the essential basis of the collective bargaining guaranteed
by the National Labor Relations Act.2  National Labor Relations Board
v. Griswold Mfg. Co., io6 F. (2d) 113 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
It has long been recognized that the prime requisite and first step to
collective bargaining is union recognition.' It is a reasonable assumption
that Congress had this fact in mind when it passed the National Labor
Relations Act,4 one of the avowed purposes of which was to increase
ii. Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1185 at 1192.
I. 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (5) (Supp. 1938) reading, "It shall be an un-
fair labor practice for an employer- . . . (5) To refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this
title." § 159 (a) reads, "Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such pur-
poses, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such a unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment: . .
2. The court also upheld the Board's finding that defendant company had interfered
with and dominated the formation and administration of another union, and supported
the contention that this was an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 158 (2) of
the Act. § 158 (2) reads in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer- . . . (2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: . . ." The
approval of the Board's order requiring defendant to disestablish this union as repre-
sentative of the company's employees clearly follows the holding in N. L. R. B. v. Penn-
sylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261 (1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 272 (1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., No. 6830,
March Term, 1938 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
3. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 266-8 (1938).
See COMMONS AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (4th ed. 1936) § 372;
CATLIN, THE LABoR PROBLEM (1926) 317, 327; RUFENER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
(1927) 399; 20THE CENTURY FuND, INC., LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (1935) 47;
YODER, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR PROBLEMS (1933) 443; U. S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Company Unions, Bulletin No.
634, cc. VII, XXII.
4. "Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations Act, had in mind the ex-
perience of the administration of the Railway Labor Act, and declared that the former
was 'an amplification and further clarification of the principles' of the latter. Report of
the House Committee on Labor, H. R. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 3. It had before
it the Railway Clerks case which had emphasized the importance of Union recognition
in securing collective bargaining. Report of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, S. Rep. 573, 74th Cong., ist Sess., p. 17, and there were then available data
showing that once an employer has conferred recognition on a particular organization
it has a marked advantage over any other in securing the adherence of employees, and
hence in preventing the recognition of any other." N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 266 (1938).
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Labor's bargaining power.5 In the instant case, Defendant company claims
that by negotiating with the designated representatives of the Lodge it has
acted in conformity with the requirements of the Act.6 Thus by an obvious
subterfuge,7 it is attempting to keep within the letter of the law, and at the
same time nullify its effect. If the defendant were allowed to persist in its
refusal to recognize the union as such, the inevitable blow to union prestige
would cause a decrease in membership, with an accompanying loss of bar-
gaining power.8 It is apparent that the court, by refusing to sanction this
attempt to circumvent the plain mandate of Section 158(5), has correctly
interpreted and applied the statute in a case where a contrary holding
would have brought about a result contradictory to the purpose and spirit
of the Act.
Taxation-Effect of Reservation of Power to Change Beneficiary
on Trust's Liability for Gift Tax-Donor created a trust in personal
property in 1913 reserving to himself the right to revoke the trust. In
1919, he relinquished the power of revocation reserving, however, in the
relinquishing instrument, the right to alter or modify the trust by changing
the beneficiaries. After passage of the gift tax statute,' donor surrendered
his power to change the beneficiaries. Held, that the gift became effective
and taxable only upon renunciation of the power to change beneficiaries
and that the statute, therefore, was not retroactively applied. Sanford v.
Commissioner, 7 U. S. L. WEEK 496 (U. S., 1939).
Respondent, in an inter vivas transfer of property in trust, reserved
to himself the power to designate new beneficiaries other than himself.
Held, that the gift was incomplete and therefore not subject to taxation
under the Revenue Act of 1932.2 Rasquin v. Humphreys, 7 U. S. L.
WEEK 500 (U. S., 1939).
The decisions represent an adherence to the maxim that "taxation is
not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with the
actual command over the property taxed", 3 and follow a long established
rule 4 which has seldom been questioned,5 although administrative inter-
5. 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1938), Findings and Declaration of
Policy. ". . . The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized . . . substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, . . .
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . .
6. See note i supra.
7. For a discussion regarding good faith on the part of the employer, see Nathan-
son, Decisions Studied in Retrospect (1937) 32 ILL. L. Rav. 196, 205.
8. N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 266 (1938).
I. 43 STAT. 3,5 (924), 26 U. S. C. A. §413 (934).
2. 47 STAT. 245 (1933), 26 U. S. C. A. § 550 (1934).
3. Corliss v. Bower, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (193o).
4. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 28o (1933) (power to revoke) ; Porter v.
Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933) (power to change beneficiaries); Hesslein v.
Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (1937) ; Harriet
W. Rosenau, 37 B. T. A. 468 (1938). Cf. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S.
339 (1g29) ; Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935). See Note (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. 684.
5. See opinion of Circuit Court of Appeals in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 58 F. (2d)
188 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), reVd, 288 U. S. 280 (933) ; Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d)
954, 956 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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pretations have been confusing.6 The theory upon which the rule is
founded is that as long as the power to revoke the trust or change the
beneficiaries exists, no economic benefits are conferred upon the donee
which would justify imposition of a tax, the donee being personally liable
for the tax where the donor fails to pay.' The courts have reasoned that
Congress could not have intended to make the donee personally liable when,
in fact, the donee might never receive benefits from the purported gift
because of the exercise of the power by the donor.8 In arriving at this
interpretation of the legislative intent, the court had an obstacle to hurdle
in the administrative 9 and legislative 1 0 declaration that where the reserved
power is one which may revest the property in the donor, the gift is not
complete and therefore not subject to the tax. There existed here a pos-
sibility of construing these declarations as setting up an exclusive excep-
tion, i. e., revocation, and as a result, the trust reserving the smaller power
of changing beneficiaries would be subject to taxation when created.1 The
instant cases, in ruling that the declarations were not exclusive, settled the
law applicable to the two situations in cases of trusts created up until 1936.
However, under the treasury regulations, as amended in 1936, ruling that
a gift is complete and taxable unless donor has reserved the power to
revest beneficial title in himself 12 a different result may be obtained. It is
submitted, however, that the regulation, now that the Supreme Court has
definitely decided the issue, will be repealed.
Taxation-Jurisdiction of State to Tax as Personal Property the
Interest of a Life Tenant in a Foreign Trust-The defendant, a resi-
dent of Pennsylvania, was life tenant of a trust created and administered
in New York where the trustees were domiciled and held the securities
forming the corpus. Pennsylvania imposed a personal property tax on the
defendant's right to receive the income of the trust.' Held, that the de-
6. Sanford case, at 497. The government also took the view in the Hesslein case,
cited note 4 supra, that the power to tax arose when the power to revest was relin-
quished. The court refused this and held that the trust was not taxable until the power
to change donees was also relinquished.
7. 47 STAT. 245 (933), 26 U. S. C. A. § 550 (1934).
8. Sanford case, at 498. The courts also deal at great length, in these cases, with
the supplemental character of the gift tax statute to federal estate taxes. The two are
said to be in pari nateria and, the definition of gifts being ambiguous in the gift tax
statutes, the courts feel that the trust with power to change beneficiaries, which is tax-
able under the estate tax, should be kep under it rather than hold it taxable under both
with the requisite deductions as permitted by the gift tax statute. See Sanford case, at
497. Accord: Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 285 (933).
9. U. S. Treas. Reg. 67, Art. i, provided that where the trust is subject to donor's
power to revest, it is not a completed gift. The regulation under the Revenue Act of
1932 is substantially the same. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 3.
10. 47 STAT. 245 (1933), 26 U. S. C. A. § 550 (1934), expressly declared that the
trust subject to donor's power to revest was not subject to the gift tax. This section
was subsequently repealed. 48 STAT. 758 (i934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 550 (1934). It
was repealed because of the decision of Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 28o (i933),
which had held that such was the law even in the absence of legislation.
ii. See dissent in Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert.
dented, 302 U. S. 756 (937).
12. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 3 (as amended in 1936). "As to any property,
. of which the donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave him no
power to cause the beneficial title to be revested in himself, the gift is complete." See
393 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. 3936.
x. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 72, § 3242 et seq. Sec. 3244 reads:
"the equitable interest in any such personal property . ., owned, held or possessed
by any resident, where the legal title . . . is vested in a trustee . . . domiciled in
another state, and where such resident is entitled to receive all or any part of the in-
come therefrom, is hereby made taxable."
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fendant does not have a taxable interest under the statute, because (i) he
as no property interest in the corpus, and (2) Pennsylvania has no juris-
diction to tax a property interest in a foreign trust under the "due process"
clause. 2  Commonwealth v. Stewart, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 2,
1939, p. I, col. 3 (Pa. C. P. 1939).
The refusal of the instant court to recognize as an equitable property
interest the right to receive the income of a trust contravenes an established
rule of trust law.3 Although at early common law, a life tenant's interesf
was considered merely a right in personam, 4 the modern trend has been
to treat it as a property right ' and therefore taxable.6 In accord with
this trend, the United States Supreme Court 7 has recently held that for
purposes of taxation, a life tenant has a property interest in the corpus.'
This view is logical since the right to receive income is generally conceded
to be one of the most valuable of all property rights. It would seem, there-
fore, that the instant court's technical distinction between a proprietary
interest in the income and a similar interest in the corpus, if sound at all,
is not applicable to the instant facts. Such a distinction also defeats the
purpose of the statute,10 which was aimed directly at the instant casem "
Furthermore, assuming that the defendant does have a property interest
in the corpus, the instant court's denial of Pennsylvania's jurisdiction to
tax that interest appears to be in conflict with the trend of recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court. 2 Originally, the Court justified
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. XIV.
3. See i BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 183; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS
(1935) § 13o; I Scorr, THE LAW or TRUSTS (1939) § 130. For a comprehensive, his-
torical study of the nature of the beneficiary's interest, see Brown, The Taxation of
Trust Property (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 403; Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui
Que Trust (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 269, 290; cf. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of
the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 467, 5oo.
4. See i BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 515-516; I Scovr, op. cit. supra. note 3, at
68I, 684-687.
5. See i BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 516-517; I Scorr, loc. cit. supra note 3;
see note 7 infra.
6. Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589 (1915) ; McCeney v. County Commissioners
et al., 135 Md. 25, 137 Atl. 291 (1927), questioned on other grounds in Blaustein v.
Levin, 4 A. (2d) 861, 863 (Md. 1939); Hunt v. Perry et al., 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E.
703 (1896) ; Maguire v. Tax Commissioner, 230 Mass. 503, 72o N. E. 62 (1918), affd
sub nora. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (1920) ; McCullough v. Seitz, 28 Pa. Super.
458 (I9o5) ; Rowe v. Braden, 126 Ohio St. 533, 186 N. E. 392 (1933) ; City of Albans
v. Avery et al., 95 Vt. 249, 114 At. 31 (1921). In the Maguire case, mpra at 16, the
court said: "It is this property right belonging to the beneficiary, realized in the shape
of income, which is the subject matter of the tax. . . ." The English House of Lords
is in accord: Baker v. Archer-Shee, (1927) A. C. 844; cf. Archer-Shee v. Garland,
(193) A. C. 212. See also Legis. (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 875, 88o.
7. Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 (1935), 35 COL. L. REv. 1151, 49 HARV. L. REV.
159; Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30o U. S. 5 (937).
8. See note 6 supra.
9. The instant court calls the right of the beneficiary "the bare one to receive net
income" (italics supplied) and requires additional "muniments of ownership" in order
to constitute a property interest in the corpus. This view loses sight of the fundamental
economic fact that property that produces no income is practically valueless.
70. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 72, § 3244, note I supra.
II. Ibid. The same view is taken in Humbird v. State Tax Commission, 141 Md.
405, 412, 119 Atl. 157, 159 (7922), involving an almost identical statute, 2 MD. ANN.
CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 81, § 2, where the court said: ". . . the manifest purpose of
the statutes . . . is to subject the interests of the cestui que trust resident in this
state in trust funds to taxation." The case was questioned on other grounds in Blau-.
stein v. Levin, 4 A. (2d) 861, 863 (Md. 1939).
12. See Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1938 Term (1939) 88
U. OF PA. L. REv. i, 12-76; (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 120.
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jurisdiction to tax on the basig of the so-called benefit theory,13 without
any serious consideration of the possibility of multiple taxation.14 It seems
clear under this approach that in view of the protection the Commonwealth
affords the defendant's interest, Pennsylvania should be permitted to
tax. 5 Furthermore, subsequent limitations of multi-state taxation were
applied only to inheritance taxes 1 and property taxes on tangible prop-
erty; 17 double taxation was sanctioned with respect to income taxes 'I and
permitted, under certain circumstances, in the case of ad valorem property
taxes on intangibles.' 9 The case of Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia,
20
which was decided at a time when the court was most vigorous in its con-
demnation of double taxation,
21 has been cited as outlawing such taxation.
22
However, because of the recent trend,3 it is probable that that case will
not be considered controlling, since it was there held that the tax was
on the entire corpus of the foreign trust, and not on the beneficiary's
interest.24  Furthermore, the latest Supreme Court decision 25 upholds
13. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 202 (19o5)
and cases cited there; see also Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364-37o (1939) (where
the court speaks also of the sovereignty theory of taxation) ; Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.
S. 383, 387 (939) ; Mr. Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Farmer's Loan and Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204, 214 (1930) ; Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion,
id. at 216; Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582, 585-
586 (1939) ; 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 120.
14. See Mr. Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 215 (930) ; 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 845.
I5. Jurisdiction to tax was similarly justified in Lawrence v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 286 U. S. 276, 279 (1932) ; New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 313
(1937).
I6. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (193o) ; First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
17. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, i9g U. S. I94 (1905) ; Wallace
v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66 (1920).
I8. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 3o8 (I937), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv.
645; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. I9 (1938), (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 356, 39 Cot. L. REV. 874, 43 HAv. L. REy. 668.
Ig. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); First Bank Stock Corp.
v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (I937); Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U. S.
5o6 (938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 556. For a vivid illustration of the fact that the court
has been more liberal in the case of property taxes than in the case of inheritance taxes,
compare First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (932), with Schuyl-
kill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, mpra.
20. 280 U. S. 83 (1929), where a set of facts similar to that of the instant case was
involved.
21. See Lowndes, supra note 12, at 12, and cases cited there in footnote 40.
22. Mayor et al. v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 368, 171 Atl. 37, 38 (I934), which is vir-
tually the exact instant case. It is important to note that in the Gibbs case, the court
decided that the tax on the life tenant's interest was equivalent to a tax on the corpus,
and, on the basis of the Safe Deposit case, unconstitutional. See also Brown, mipra
note 3, at 426.
On the other hand, several state supreme courts have held that the state of the
beneficiary's domicile has the jurisdiction to tax. Hunt v. Perry et al., I65 Mass. 287,
43 N. E. IO3 (I896) ; Rowe v. Braden, 126 Ohio St. 533, 186 N. E. 392 (I933), (935)
2 OHIO OPS. 289. The Hunt case has been labelled "the leading case directly in favor
of the proposition that a state may validly impose a property tax upon the interest of a
beneficiary in a trust, although the trustee is a resident of another state and is taxed by
the state of his residence upon the trust property." Brown, supra note 3, at 420.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. Id. at 292. See also Mr. Justice Stone's concurring opinion at 296: "If the
question were here I should not be prepared to go so far as to say that -the equitable
rights in personam of the beneficiaries of the trust might not have been taxed at the
place of their domicile. .... )
25. Curry v. McCanless, 3o7 U. S. 357 (I939), 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 120; accord,
Graves v. Elliot, 307 U. S. 383 (I939), 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 120; see also Newark
Fire Insurance Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313 (1939), 88 U. OF PA.
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double taxation of intangibles with respect to inheritance taxes, where con-
stitutional limitations were usually most rigidly enforced. In view of this
recent retreat from a strict construction of due process with respect to
double taxation, it is doubtful that the instant decision will be followed in
subsequent cases."
Taxation-Validity of Pennsylvania Corporate Franchise Tax-
Defendant, a foreign corporation doing both an operating and holding
company business, was assessed for taxation in Pennsylvania according
to the formula 1 provided by the Franchise Tax of 1935.2 The measure of
the tax thus settled included the intangible value of the holding company
business conducted in New York. Held, (reversing the lower court) that,
whereas the taxing statute was valid, the assessment, under the circum-
stances, should be revised to exclude the holding company value in the
measure. Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas and Electric Co., Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Sept. 27, 1939, P. I, col. 3 (Pa. 1939).
This is the first real test of the 1935 tax which was admittedly designed
to reach intangible values of foreign corporations and thus equalize the tax
burden between domestic and foreign corporations.2 In order to accom-
plish this result the legislature chose to tax the franchise of the foreign
corporation and measure this tax by the value of the capital stock appor-
tioned to the state. In so doing, it adopted a type of statute repeatedly
upheld by the courts. 4 The only difficulty with this tax was the measure.
A tax measured by out of state values will not be saved by the fact that it
is called a "franchise" tax.5 But if the amount of the tax is determined
with reference to values within the state, it is of no consequence that these
values are enhanced by their kinship to property, business, franchises, or
other intangible values owned or exercised outside the state.6 Conse-
L. Rav. 12o. All these cases are discussed by Lowndes, supra note 12, at 12-16, where,
speaking of the Newark Fire Insurance case (which involved a property tax), he said:
"The gist of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion (in which three other justices con-
curred) seems to be that the corporate domicil may tax a corporation's intangibles, re-
gardless of the existence of an independent business situs elsewhere." This would seem
to answer the very question previously posed by this author. Lowndes, The Supreme
Court on Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 149, 154.
26. (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 120.
27. See 2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 847; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 511,
512; (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 24o, 241; (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 120.
Tangible property in Pennsylvania
I. X 1/3 Total value of capital stock plus
Total tangible property
Pennsylvania payroll Gross receipts attrib-X 2/3 Total value of capital stock plus
Total payroll Total g-oss
utable to Pennsylvania
X 1/3 Total value of capital stock.receipts
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 72, §§ 1871, 1891-1902.
3. Instant case, p. i, col. i.
4. Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922) ; New York v. Latrobe,
279 U. S. 421 (1929) ; International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429 (1929) ; South-
ern Realty Corp. v. McCallum, i F. Supp. 614 (W. D. Tex. 1932). See Hans Rees'
Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
5. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. r (19o9); Southern Ry. Co. v.
Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76 (1927); Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis, 274 Fed. 975 (S. D. N.
Y. 1921).
6. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897) ; Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 3oi U. S. 412 (1937). See also cases cited supra note 4.
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quently the problem is reduced to determining (i) what degree of rela-
tionship must be found between foreign assets and local assets in order to
say legitimately that the former enhance the value of the latter, and (2)
how much the value is enhanced. The statute in question does not differ-
entiate between related and unrelated foreign values but includes all in the
measure. Consequently a literal application of the statute brings it squarely
under the constitutional prohibition of Western Union v. Kansas.7 But
this objection, which provoked the lower court to invalidate the statute,
was avoided by Chief Justice Kephart on the theory that the legislature
could not have meant to include untouchables in the measure merely be-
cause it failed to exclude them. Hence, having decided that the defendant
corporation was not doing a holding company business in Pennsylvania
and that this business was, therefore, untouchable by Pennsylvania, he
directed the tax officials to disregard these items in their calculation.8 This
solution is in line not only with former Pennsylvania decisions 9 but also
with those of the Supreme Court of the United States.Y This matter dis-
posed of, the method of allocating values to Pennsylvania was approved
as of course. Two of the allocation factors, considered separately, have
been upheld. 1' The combination of all three in one formula is, on its face,
more accurate and fair than any one factor considered separately.12 Ad-
mitting that a still more accurate allocating method could be devised,"3
nevertheless the purpose of the statute is revenue, not accuracy, and as
long as the inaccuracy does not shock the judicial conscience it will not run
foul of the Constitution.
Torts-Negligent Injury of Schoolchild-School district trustees
were sued by a ten year old schoolboy for the loss of an eye sustained dur-
ing recess when another pupil threw a goldenrod stalk at him. None of
the recreation was supervised, and other pupils had been injured from the
same activity. Defendants' motion to set aside a verdict and dismiss the
complaint was granted. Held, that the complaint was properly dismissed.
Defendants were under no duty to fashion guides for the safe conduct of
the pupils in their play. Hoose v. Drum, 281 N. Y. 54, 22 N. E. (2d)
233 (I939)-
7. 216 U. S. i (igog).
8. The court did not discuss whether, had the corporation been "doing a holding
company business" in Pennsylvania, such business would have been taxable as a sepa-
rate unit. Such division of dual-enterprise corporations for taxing purposes would
result in a fair and reasonable method for determining the value of the dual franchise
exercised in the state, but it would mean a greatly diminished revenue in comparison
with that collectible if the property fraction of allocation is applied to the "intangible"
business as well as the "tangible" business.
9. Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., ioi Pa. ii (1882); cf. Turco Paint &
Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 42I, 184 Atl. 37 (1936).
io. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 (1904); Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina,
283 U. S. 123 (1931). See also Standard Oil Co. v. Throensen, 29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1928).
ii. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920) (Tangible
property fraction) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Clark, ioo F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ;
American Refining Co. v. Staples, 269 S. W. 42o (Tex. App. Com. 1925) (Gross re-
ceipts fraction). See also United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321
(i918) ; Woods Lumber Co. v. Hall, 158 Tenn. 458, I4 S. W. (2d) 734 (1929).
12. See Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 320 Pa. 421, 184 Atl. 37 (1936),
where an identical allocation formula was heartily endorsed in regard to the Pennsyl-
vania Corporate Net Income Tax.
Tangible and intangible property in Pa.
Total tangible and intangible property
13. F'or instance: X Capital stock.
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Claimant, an eleven year old schoolgirl at a state normal school, while
acting under a practice teacher, and following precisely the forms pre-
scribed by the Board of Regents, suffered a dislocated vertebra while doing
a head stand. She had performed the same feat in two previous grades of
school.' The Court of Claims recommended a dismissal. Held, (one jus-
tice dissenting) claimant should recover. There was negligence in the
failure to instruct her pursuant to the customary method. Gardner v. State
of New York, 281 N. Y. 212 (i939).
In a jurisdiction that stands alone in having abrogated the doctrine
that a school district is immune, in the absence of statute,' from tort lia-
bility for injuries to pupils suffered in connection with their attendance, s it
may at first impression seem difficult to reconcile the Hoose case with the
result in Gardner v. State. It is clear that in the latter case, since the
claimant was injured in a state operated school, the state has consented to
suit in its Court of Claims,4 but the responsibility of the school district in
the former case for its own negligence should be no less tenuous in the
light of New York precedent.5 However, the statute defining the duties
of defendants in the Hoose case 6 fails to disclose any duty to supervise
playground activities in the absence of an assumption of such by the hiring
of a person for that purpose. 7 Furthermore, much as the New York courts
may be commended for having attacked the majority doctrine of immunity,'
even that jurisdiction has not extended the liability of such an entity to
include the negligence of its agents or employees.9 Such vicarious lia-
bility being absent, it has been provided by statute that all teachers and
persons in supervisory positions, in school districts of less than one million
population, must be protected or insured against financial loss in suits for
I. Gardner v. State, at 215, and 166 N. Y. Misc. 113, 144 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
2. Only three such statutes have been found. CAL. STAT. (Deering, 1931) Act
7519, § 2.801; OMt. STAT. (Lord, igio) 358; 3 WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1931)
tit. 6, §§ 950, 951 (amended § 47o6).
3. 4 DILLON, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. I9II) § 1658; Note (1932) 46
HARv. L. REv. 305; Note (1928) 56 A. L. R. 164. The majority view is well set out
in the Pennsylvania case of Carlo v. Scranton School District, 319 Pa. 417, 179 Atl.
56I (1935).
4. N. Y. LAws 1897, c. 36. By this act New York established its Court of Claims
to hear all actions against the state.
S. Wahrman v. Board of Education, 187 N. Y. 331, 8o N. E. 192 (1907) ; Jaked
v. Board of Education, 234 N. Y. 591, 138 N. E. 458 (1922); Howell v. Union Free
School District No. I, 250 App. Div. 81o, 294 N. Y. Supp. 333 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Gar-
ber v. Central School District No. I, 251 App. Div. 214, 295 N. Y. Supp. 850 (3d Dep't
1937) ; accord, Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, 207 N. Y. 203, ioo N. E. 8o6
(1912).
6. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW, § 275, subdivisions 1-22.
7. Id. at subdivision 8. This must be carefully distinguished from the unqualified
duty of a Board of Education in New York (defendants in the Hoose case being trus-
tees of a school district) to provide supervision for playgrounds. N. Y. EDUCATION
LAW, § 310, subdivision 15; Garber v. Central School District No. I, 251 App. Div. 214,
295 N. Y. Supp. 850 (3d Dep't 1937). While § 275, subdivision 9, places the duty of
establishing "rules for the government and discipline of the schools" on trustees, this
broad duty must be governed, in relation to playgrounds, by the more specific terms of
subdivision 8. See § 275, subdivisions 14-15, concerning duties to repair and to abate
nuisances. But the patch of goldenrod in the Hoose case can hardly be ground in dis-
repair or a nuisance.
8. See (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 151; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 296, where the im-
munity doctrine is described as a "highly undesirable" rule.
9. Donovan v. Board of Education, 85 N. Y. 117 (i88i) ; Katterschinsky v. Board
of Education, 215 App. Div. 695, 212 N. Y. Supp. 424 (2d Dep't 1925). But see Lessin
v. Board of Education, 247 N. Y. 503, 511, 161 N. E. i6o, 163 (1928). Here the court
held that aside from any rule of agency, since the duty of maintaining grounds was non-
delegable, the Board was liable if its employees failed to properly discharge their duties.
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negligence.10 If there was a breach of any duty to supervise the child's
activities arising from the in loco parentis relationship,", recovery would
have to be had in an action against the negligent teacher.12
On the other hand, in Gardner v. State where responsibility for negli-
gence stands admitted,' 3 it would seem that the facts do not warrant the
result. Claimant had followed exactly the procedure outlined by the Board
of Regents, but recovery was allowed because she had not been instructed
in certain exercises in the first, second, and third grades, as was cus-
tomary. 4 Since, by her own testimony, she had on other occasions per-
formed the exact feat from which the injury was sustained," and had for
nearly three years received competent instruction and participated in
similar stunts, the lack of such preliminary instruction appears too remote
a cause as the basis for a reversal of the Court of Claims' recommendation
of dismissal. If the court had found, in accordance with the conclusion of
the Appellate Division, that the state was negligent in requiring an immature
child to perform such an act,' 6 the imposition of liability would have been
more justifiable. In either case, however, New York has not left the in-
jured child without recourse to recovery if entitled to it on the facts.
Unfortunately, this is far from the prevailing situation in most states.
Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition-Validity Under Fair
Trade Act of Single Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Contract-
A distributor of trade marked perfumery products, which entered into con-
tracts with retailers specifying minimum price of 50 cents for any quantity
less than one ounce of its product, seeks to enjoin ' sale of such in vials 2
containing fraction of an ounce at 1O cents, under Fair Trade Act.' Held
(two judges dissenting), that defendant's resales constituted unfair com-
petition within the meaning of the Act. Lentheric, Inc., v. W. T. Grant
Co., 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 169 (App. Div. ist Dep't. 1939).
In its interpretation of the New York Act the instant case seems to
mark a further development in legalizing certain types of restraint on
trade. The main objection to the single minimum price contract is that it
in effect restricts the quantity in which a product may be sold. Such a
restriction, it is argued, is a limitation on alienation of property not per-
io. N. Y. EDUCATION LAw § 569 (a). Since few school districts have more than
"one million population", it is obvious that this provision is nearly all inclusive.
xi. TAYLOR, PUBLIC SCHrOOL LAW (1892) § 153, at 177; see Commonwealth v. Seed,
5 Pa. L. J. R. 78; Harris v. Galilley, 125 Pa. Super. 505, 51o (1937).
12. No cases have been found which impose a duty on teachers to supervise their
pupils, other than to say that the teacher stands in loco parentis. For a full discussion
of affirmative duties see Bohlen, The Basis of Affirnmtive Obligations in the Law of
Tort (19o5) 53 Am. LAw REG. 209.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. Gardner v. State, at 214, 216.
15. See note I supra.
16. 256 App. Div. 385, io N. Y. S. (2d) 274 (3d Dep't 1939).
I. Submission of controversy pursuant to § 546 of the N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT
(Cahill, 1931).
2. Defendant procured the perfume from third persons, who had obtained it from
sources unknown to plaintiff and had rebottled it in the smaller vials bearing plaintiff's
trade-mark.
3. N. Y. CONsoL. LAws (Cahill, Cum. Supp. 1931-35) c. 67, §§ 1-2 (entitled: "An
Act to protect trade mark owners, distributors and the public against injurious and un-
economic practices in the distribution of articles of standard quality under a distin-
guished trade mark, brand or name").
236 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
missible under the Fair Trade Act.4  According to this view, the Fair
Trade Acts were directed against predatory price cutting as such, and the
restraint thus allowed should be kept within strict bounds.' Strong reliance
is placed upon the case of Prestonettes, Inc., v. Coty,6 which held that a
seller might rebottle trade marked commodities and sell them in any quan-
tity he desired, provided that he used labels giving notice of the rebottling.
On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that use of a price main-
tenance contract to enforce sale of a commodity in a particular manner or
in a particular quantity is outside the legislative intent. Adoption of the
various Fair Trade Acts 7 was the result of agitation by interested groups
which sought protection of the carefully built up good will evidenced by the
owner's trade-mark." Thus the purpose of the Act apparently was to
authorize price restriction as a means of protecting the owner's good will.'
The United States Supreme Court 10 so interpreted a similar Illinois act,1
and, on the basis of the Court's reasoning, the fact that a minimum price
restricts the quantity in which the products are sold is therefore of no
consequence if the price were set really to protect the producer's good will.
Following this interpretation, 2 injunctions were decreed under similar
statutes against the price cutting retailers on facts almost identical with
those of the principal case in recent decisions in California,
3 New York,14
and Pennsylvania.'5 Allowing a product, marketed as a "style merchan-
dize", to be sold cheaply in small quantities would obviously divest it of its
exclusive character.' Hence enforcing a single minimum price in order to
prevent such a practice would appear to come within the scope of the Act.
4. See the dissenting opinion by Callahan, J., in the instant case at p. 173.
5. Cf. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 6 A. (2d) 843 (Pa. 1939).
6. 264 U. S. 359 (1924). This case, however, was decided before the enactment of
the Fair Trade Acts, and, moreover, it was stated in the opinion, at p. 369, that this
was "not a suit for unfair competition."
7. The first Fair Trade Act was passed in California, Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering,
193) v. 3, tit. 614, Act 8782, § i. Most of the states now have statutes based on the
California act and essentially identical with it. The Pennsylvania statute was enacted
in 1935. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 73, § 7-8. McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 8o3, affords a comprehensive discussion of the various
statutes. Other recent material on the application of these acts may be found in Legis.
(1937) 22 CoaN. L. Q. 445, (1938) 52 HAav. L. REy. 284, (1936) 30 ILI. L. Ray. 638.
8. McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 815.
9. The title of the New York statute is broad enough to cover the decision in the
instant case. See note 3 supra. Furthermore, the language of the Act imposes no re-
striction as to minimum prices. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Wis-
consin statute has been modified so as to provide a method whereby a contract unrea-
sonable as to minimum prices may be declared to be in restraint of trade. Wis. Laws
1935, c. 52, as amended by Wis. Laws 1935, c. 477, § 7.
xo. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183
(1936) (upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois Fair Trade Act).
Ii. Ill. Laws 1935, p. I43 Fair Trade Act " 1-.
12. Since the acts in California, Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania are to all
intents identical, a decision on one of the statutes has greater persuasive authority than
would ordinarily be the case.
13. DeVoin v. W. T. Grant Co., io6 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 1125,io6 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1938).
14. Guerlain, Inc. v. Woolworth Co., i7o Misc. I5o, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 886 (Sup.
Ct. 1939).
15. Lentheric, Inc. v. Woolworth Co., 35 D. & C. 572 (Pa. 1939).
16. See Brief for Complainant, p. 12, Lentheric, Inc. v. Woolworth Co., 35 D. & C.
572 (Pa. x939).
